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Arguments are as much a part of life as are agreements. Today's
businessmen, like the traders of yesterday, know that commercial
disagreements require fast, efficient, and effective settlement. While
we may think of the courts as the primary mechanism for solving
disputes, most disagreements are resolved informally while increas-
ing numbers are being solved through formal, but alternative
methods.' Arbitration is one such method.
Arbitration is the submission of a disagreement to an impartial
arbitrator (or arbitration panel) with the understanding that the
parties will abide by the arbitrator's decision.2 Although arbitra-
tion among parties certainly has elements of the judicial process,
it is an alternative that co-exists with the court system, without
purporting to replace it. 3
Arbitration has been used since the days of early traders and the
days of Greek city states. 4 Professor Darby lists 540 cases submit-
ted to arbitral procedures after 1794.5 Arbitration was employed
1. R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION - WHAT You NEED To KNow 5 (2d ed.
1982).
2. See generally id. at 5.
3. DoMKE COMM ARBITRATION § 1:01 (Rev. Ed).
Unfortunately, arbitration was not always viewed in this light. At common
law, arbitration was historically viewed with disfavor. The origin of this attitude
is commonly traced to the dictum of Lord Coke in Vynior's Case, 8 Coke Rep. 8 lb,
77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K.B. 1069). The English courts held that individuals may not
cqntract to "oust" the courts of jurisdiction. Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wilson 129, 95
Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746). Peter Sonderby in his article, Commercial Arbitra-
tlion: Enforcement of an Agreement to Arbitrate Future Disputes, 5 J. MAR. J.
PRAc. & PROC. 72 (1971), notes that this concept of "ouster" was adopted at an
early stage in the United States. The historical development of this concept and
its abolition in America is well described in Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Co., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942), where the court felt an "obligation
to shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration." For a history of arbitration
in the United States, see F. KELLOR. AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY. FUNCTIONS
AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948).
4. Gertrude Smith, The Greeks had a word for it-25 Centuries Ago,
Arbitration Magazine, Vol. I, Nos.4-5 (1943), p.5.
5. W. EVANS DARBY, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 769 (1904). (Although these
were arbitrations among nation-states the underlying claim was often of a com-
mercial nature.) See also J.H. RALSTON. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS
TO LOcARNO 345 (1929).
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not only in Europe at this time, but also in the United States, Latin
America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.6 Although many of
these settlements may not have been arbitration in the full sense
of the term today, Darby's list indicates the "tremendous prestige
of international arbitration in the 19th Century."-7 Today, private
commercial arbitration improves the climate of international trade
by providing the forums essential to efficient disposal of disputes
between business parties of different nations.
In order for international arbitration to be effective, however, the
parties must be able to enforce arbitral awards.8 Treaties have been
enacted to guarantee the international respect necessary for the
domestic courts of various nations to enforce private foreign ar-
bitral awards.
Not surprisingly, these international agreements contain certain
exceptions under which the courts may legally refuse to enforce
a foreign arbitral award. The Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 commonly known as the
New York Convention of 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the New
York Convention), currently governs the recognition and enforce-
ment within the United States of foreign arbitration awards ob-
tained outside the United States. This treaty contains a public
policy exception which permits domestic courts to refuse enforce-
ment of a foreign arbitration award if the award violates the public
policy of the nation in which enforcement is sought. Unfortunately,
a broad interpretation of the public policy defense undermines the
strength and effectiveness of the New York Convention, and in turn,
casts doubts on the effectiveness of international arbitration. This
Note first discusses the value and history of international arbitra-
tion, then explores the New York Convention's public policy ex-
ception to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and finally,
offers an approach for the application of the public policy excep-
tion in a manner that does not threaten international trade or public
policy.
6. For a history of Arbitration in the United States, see F. KELLOR. AMERICAN
ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY. FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948).
7. Wright, Arbitration As a Symbol of Internationalism, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ARBITRATION 4 (M. Domke ed. 1958).
8. The extent to which nation-states are bound by arbitration has always
been controversial. John Basset Moore classified international arbitration between
states as a judicial procedure. Moore, Digest Vol. 7, at 24. Elihu Root, however,
thought arbitration between nation-states to be largely a political procedure.
Hackworth, Digest Vol. 6, at 61.
9. 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1959); 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as New York Convention].
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I. ARBITRATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
A. The Value of Arbitration
The value of arbitration in international business stems from its
many advantages over judicial resolution of disagreements. Sur-
veys taken by the American Arbitration Association indicate that
arbitration is often preferred because business interests prefer to
have their disputes settled by someone with expertise in the field
of the dispute.' 0 Since arbitration clauses can specify who the ar-
bitrator shall be, an agreed upon individual with expertise and ex-
perience in the area of the dispute can be appointed." This elim-
inates the possibility of the legal system of a country unfairly favor-
ing its own citizen. The speed and simplicity of arbitration is an
attractive inducement when businesses do not want to have their
capital and stock tied up in a long court proceeding, especially when
market rates are fluctuating rapidly. The complexity of interna-
tional litigation lacks the certainty and predictability that busi-
nesses desire. Additionally, arbitration preserves confidentiality
which contributes to the continuance of long term business rela-
tionships since trade secrets are not released and reputations are
not damaged as in open trials and reported court decisions. Ar-
bitral awards are not subject to judicial review or appeal. This
serves the international business community's interest in con-
clusive results. Arbitration also avoids the pragmatic problems of
language differences, service of process, and finding legal represen-
tation qualified to practice in a foreign court.12 In sum, the use of
arbitration increases the security of international transactions and
thus eases the barriers to international trade.' 3
The demand for international arbitration has resulted in the
development of hundreds of arbitration agencies that now offer ser-
vices for dispute resolution between citizens of different countries.14
Some of the most popular and well known include the American
10. R. COULSON. BusINEss ARBITRATION-WHAT YOU NEED TO KNow 7 (2d ed. 1982).
11. Id.
12. Aksen, The Need to Utilize International Arbitration, 17 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 11 (1984).
13. For further benefits of arbitration such as increase in trade, investment,
free world security, human freedom, and justice, see generally Gardner, Economic
and Political Implications of International Commercial Arbitration in INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION (M. Domke ed. 1958).
14. Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives In the Age of Aquarius:
United States Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1971).
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Arbitration Association, the International Chamber of Commerce,
and the London Court of Arbitration. ' 5 The parties may designate
the forum, procedures, and rules of law or equity to be used. The
assurance of these conditions agreed to beforehand establishes
reliable principles and procedures controlling the resolution of any
dispute, and therefore aids the parties in understanding and per-
forming their duties under the contract.
B. The Historical Framework of Arbitration
Arbitration has long been accepted in the United States. As early
as 1855 the United States Supreme Court stated that "As a mode
of settling disputes, it [arbitration] should receive every encourage-
ment from courts of equity."' 6 Both state and federal legislation
have generally reflected this common law acceptance of arbitra-
tion.' 7 The federal legislation concerning arbitration is primarily
contained in the Federal Arbitration Act which was first enacted
in 1925 and has been amended several times since.' 8 The most
recent amendment was made in 1970 in order to implement the
accession by the United States to the New York Convention.
The New York Convention of 1958 was built upon the ground
work established by the Geneva Protocol of 1923 on Arbitration
Clauses,' 8 the Geneva Convention of 1927 on the Execution of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 20 and a result of a request in 1953 by the
International Chamber of Commerce to the United Nations
Economic and Social Council to convene on the subject of enforce-
ment of international arbitration judgments. 2' The New York Con-
vention was also precipitated by the increased demand for com-
mercial arbitration by international businesses trying to achieve
the advantages of arbitration. 2 2
15. The workings of these and other arbitral institutions are well described
in HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (E. Cohn, M.
Domke, F. Eisenman ed. 1977).
16. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1855).
17. HOLTZMANN, United States, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1 (1984).
18. Id.
19. Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 157.
20. Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept.
26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301.
21. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE
L. J. 1049, 1059 (1961).
22. See generally Aksen, supra note 14.
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The United States was a participant when the New York Con-
vention was negotiated in 1958. However, on the basis of the U.S.
delegation's recommendation against acceptance of the Conven-
tion, the United States did not sign despite the Convention's ac-
ceptance by ten countries immediately and thirteen more within
the immediate ratification period.23 The delegation's negative
recommendation stemmed from the judgment that acceptance of
the Convention would not be advantageous to the United States,
and that it would conflict with United States procedures and prin-
ciples of law at that time.24 Interested private individuals 2 5 and
groups 26 expressed support for the Convention, however, and in
1968 the President submitted the Convention to the Senate for its
advice and consent.2 7
The use of arbitration had developed substantially in the United
States at that time, and an increasing number of bilateral United
States treaties had begun to include arbitration provisions. This
development of the legal infrastructure since 1958 also set the stage
for acceptance. 28 The Senate approved the Convention and Congress
passed implementing legislation in 1970.29 The New York Conven-
tion became effective in the United States on December 29, 1970.30
The Convention has now been accepted by sixty-five States.3 1 The
advantages of the new Convention over its predecessors were out-
lined at the close of the meetings by Mr. Schurmann, the Presi-
dent of the Conference. In his view,
... it was already apparent that the document represented an improve-
ment on the Geneva Convention of 1927. It gave a wider definition of the
awards to which the convention applied; it reduced and simplified the
requirements with which the party seeking recognition or enforcement
of an award would have to comply; it placed the burden of proof on the
23. Quigley, supra note 21, at 1060.
24. McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign
Arbitral Awards in the United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 735, 737 (1971).
25. See generally Quigley, supra note 21.
26. Springer. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 INT'L L. 320, 321 (1969).
27. Message from the President, Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. ExEc. Doc. E. 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1, 3-5,
27-44 (1968).
28. For a history of the development of the legal infrastructure that permitted
the acceptance of the New York convention, see Aksen, supra note 14, at 4.
29. Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692, 9 U.S.C. 201 (1970).
30. Note, United Nations Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention: United States
Accession, 2 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 67 (1971).
31. International Commercial Arbitration: New York Convention, part VI. 1
(G. Gaja ed. 1984).
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party against whom recognition or enforcement was invoked; it gave the
parties greater freedom in the choice of the arbitral authority and of the
arbitration procedure; it gave the authority before which the award was
sought to be relied upon the right to order the party opposing the enforce-
ment to give suitable security. 32
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE
A. An Overview of the New York Convention
Despite the advantages of arbitration, it is valuable only to the
extent that the agreement to arbitrate and the resulting award can
be enforced against a recalcitrant party. Since parties to interna-
tional arbitration agreements and disputes are often individuals
or corporations of different countries, one of the parties may have
to rely on the court of another nation to enforce an arbitral award
that was issued in yet a third nation. Absent some international
agreement to recognize and enforce such an award, international
law does not impose any such obligation.3 3 The New York Con-
vention now imposes such an obligation on its signatories.
The principal features and obligations of the New York Conven-
tion are set forth in Articles I through VI. Article I establishes the
limitations of the treaty's scope. The treaty applies only to foreign
(international) commercial agreements to arbitrate. Article I also
permits States to limit their obligation to enforce only awards made
in reciprocating nations. Article II provides that the arbitration
clause must be in writing, and requires the subject matter to be
capable of arbitration. 34 Article III requires each contracting State
to recognize and enforce arbitral awards fairly. Article IV provides
that a party may obtain recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award by merely supplying a certified copy of the contract contain-
ing the agreement to arbitrate and a certified copy of the arbitrator's
award. Article V(1) details the allowable defenses that may be raised
by the parties to the recognition and enforcement of the award,
while Article V(2) states the grounds on which the court itself may
32. U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/SR.25, p.2 (1958).
33. Butsee Sultan, The United Nations Arbitration Convention and United
States Policy, 53 AM.J. INT'L L. 807, 816, 817 (1959), which argues that reciprocity
and comity bind nations to enforce arbitration awards.
34. It has been argued that an arbitral award that cannot be enforced because
of public policy is also a matter that is not capable of arbitration. The overlap be-
tween Article V(2)(a) and Article II has been well noted elsewhere and is not covered
in this paper. See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth
Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 164 (1st Cir. 1983); Quigley, supra note 21, at 1064; Aksen,
supra note 13, at 8; McMahon, supra note 24, at 753.
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ex officio deny enforcement. Article VI permits the court either to
accept an Article V reason to deny enforcement of the award or
to accept the argument of the party seeking enforcement of the
award and require security on the award from the opposing party.
35
In practical terms, a party seeking enforcement of an arbitral
award against a party in the United States would simply mail a
copy of both the original contract and the arbitrator's decision to
the U.S. federal district court having jurisdicton over the oppos-
ing party. The court then enters judgment on the award. If the judg-
ment upholds the award, the prevailing party may use all legal
means to execute the judgment.
Despite what would logically appear to be a strong interest in the
promotion of international conventions and uniform rules to en-
force arbitration agreements and thus to increase the certainty of
international trade agreements, the United States has lagged in
its response to developments in this area.36 Indeed, while the New
York Convention marks the first time the United States has acceded
to a multilateral treaty on the subject,37 even here the accession
came twelve years after initially rejecting the Convention as un-
favorable to the United States.38 The accomplishment of the New
York Convention, however, is marred by the public policy excep-
tion of Article V. Article V permits the courts to refuse to recognize
or enforce an award if the appropriate court of that nation finds
that such recognition or enforcement of the award would be con-
trary to the public policy of that country.39
35. Article VII states that the Convention shall not affect the validity of other
agreements entered into by the contracting States, except that The Geneva Pro-
tocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execu-
tion of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 shall cease to have effect on contracting
States. Articles ViII, IX, and X address the procedure of accession to the Conven-
tion. Article XI details the applicability of the Convention to a federal or non-unitary
State. Articles XII and XIII specify when the Convention comes into force or may
be terminated in regard to specific States. Article XIV limits the use of the Con-
vention by a contracting State against other contracting States to the extent the
first State is bound by the Convention. Article XV stipulates for the Secretary-
General of the United Nations to notify the contracting States of the status of the
other contracting States. Finally, Article XVI states that the Chinese, English,
French, Russian, and Spanish texts of the Convention are all equally authentic,
and that the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit a certified copy
of the Convention to the contracting States.
36. McMahon, supra note 24, at 736.
37. U.S./U.N. press release 126 dated Sept. 30, 1970, in DEPT STATE BULL..
Nov. 9, 1970 at 598.
38. See McMahon, supra note 24.
39. New York Convention Article V(2)(b).
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The refusal to enforce an arbitral award goes right to the heart
of the Convention. Article V sums up the grounds for the refusal
of recognition and enforcement. Article V(1)(a) through (e) points
out the arguments the court may accept from the parties to refuse
the award.40 Article V(2) deals with the two grounds of public policy
that the court of its own accord may invoke to refuse an award.
Article V(2)(a) states that recognition may be refused if the dispute
is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of that
country. Both commentators and courts have seen this provision
as parallel to Article II or subsumed by the term "public policy." 41
Article V(2)(b) deals with the public policy issue directly when it
40. These include:
1) The parties to the agreement are under some "incapacity."
2) The arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the
parties have subjected it, or under the law of the country where the
award was made.
3) There is no "proper notice" given to the party against whom the
award is to be enforced. Although no standards for judging the pro-
priety of the notice or the adequacy of opportunity to be heard are
specified, Americans are so imbued with the concept of "due pro-
cess," that it is unlikely that our courts will have any difficulty in
construing these terms.
4) The party against whom enforcement of the award is sought is
"otherwise unable to present his case." It is important to note that
this section does not provide for refusal of an award on the grounds
that it was rendered "ex parte." It seems clear, therefore, that ar-
bitrators would be able to render awards upon the default of a party
who was duly notified of the appointment of the arbitrator, but
merely elected not to appear at the proceedings.
5) If the matter decided, or an inseparable part of it goes beyond the
scope of the agreement to arbitrate. This is undoubtedly similar to
the provisions in modern American arbitration statutes that provide
an award may be set aside when the arbitrator exceeds his power
under the agreement.
6) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure
is not in accordance with the parties' agreement, or if not specified,
the agreement is not in accordance with the law of the country in
which the arbitration takes place. It is apparent that the parties have
complete automony in the selection of the arbitral procedure, pro-
viding it is not illegal "under the law to which the parties have sub-
jected it" as per Article V. para. l(a).
7) The award has not yet become "binding" on the parties or has been
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in
which, or under the law of which, the award was made.
Aksen, supra note 14 at 11, 12.
A discussion of other arguments, and how they are distinguished from
the public policy argument, can also be found in Note, The Public Policy Defense
to Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
228, 231 (1977).
41. See note 34 supra.
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states that recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may
be refused if it would be "contrary to the public policy of that
country." This public policy defense to the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards has been considered the greatest single threat to
the use of arbitration in commercial disputes.42 Courts and com-
mentators alike have worried that the expansion of this loophole
could negate the effectiveness of the Convention.43 Yet, it appears
that while the defense is often raised, it is rarely successful. 44
B. Legislative History of the New York Convention
When a United States federal court is presented with a question
regarding the scope of the public policy defense in the New York
Convention, ostensibly that court would turn toward generally ac-
cepted methods of treaty interpretation such as, inter alia, refer-
ring to the negotiating history of the Convention. 45 Unfortunately,
the history of the Convention in regard to the public policy excep-
tion is sparse.
The United Nations committee that prepared the draft conven-
tion indicated in its report to the U.N. Conference its intent to limit
the application of the public policy exception "[T]o cases in which
the recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award would
be distinctly contrary to the basic principles of the legal system
of the country where the award is invoked." 46
The Secretary General considered the comments submitted by
governments, organizations, and others before simplifying this to
read: "If the arbitral award would have the effect of compelling
the parties to act in a manner contrary to public policy in the
country of enforcement. ' 47 While discussion on the definition of
42. Note, The Public Policy Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 228 (1977).
43. See generally Parsons & Whittmore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale
De L'Industrie Du Papier [RAKTAI, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); G. Haight, CON-
VENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN AWARDS-SUMMARY
ANALYSIS OF RECORD OF UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE MAY/JUNE 67 (1958).
44. Sanders, A Twenty Years' Review of the Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAW. 269, 270 (1979).
45. "[Wlhen the meaning of a treaty is not clear, recourse may be had to
the negotiations, preparatory works, and diplomatic correspondence .... "Arizona
v. California, 292 U.S. 341,359-60 (1934). See also Block v. Compagnie Nationale
Air France, 386 F.2d 323,336-37 (5th Cir. 1967), cerL denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
46. U.N. ESCOR, Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of Interna-
tional Arbitral Awards §49, U.N. Doc. E/2704 and Corr. 1, E/AC.42/4Rev. 1 (1955).
47. Haight, supra note 43, at 67.
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public policy, or ordre public,48 presented varied national positions,
the final draft clearly seemed to reflect an intention to narrow the
possible use of public policy. 49 Some commentators felt that the
effect of the exception was to create an "escape clause" that was
necessary for ratification of the Convention by the United States.50
This escape clause, however, may not be as flexible in the hands
of United States courts as some commentators may like to believe.
The domestic court is obliged to interpret the treaty in a manner
consistent with the international norm to prevent claims of a United
States violation of the treaty. Such a violation, if presented to an
international tribunal, 5' is not necessarily determined by United
States domestic legal standards, but rather by the standards of in-
ternational law. 52
Still, courts may be tempted to turn toward domestic standards
of public policy for guidelines. State and federal courts have refused
to enforce domestic arbitration agreements on the basis of public
policy.53 Unfortunately, the exact scope of the public policy defense
against domestic arbitration is also a matter of flux and litigation. 54
However, even if domestic public policy standards are clarified,
Professor Sanders points out the mistake in relying on domestic
public policy standards in international disputes. He discusses the
distinction that the courts draw between the public policy test in
purely national affairs and the public policy test to be applied in
international agreements.55 "In respect to the latter [international
48. Ordre public is the term used in the French text to translate "public
policy." The French text is as equally authentic as the English text. New York
Convention Article XVI(1).
49. The Chairman of the Working Party said that "as regards to paragraph
2(b) of Article IV, the Working Party felt that the provision allowing refusal of en-
forecement on grounds of public policy should not be given a broad scope of ap-
plication." Haight, supra note 43, at 67. (Article IV was changed to Article V in
a later draft.)
50. Barry, Application of the Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention: A Modest Proposal,
51 TEMPLE L. Q. 832, 839 (1978).
51. Such as the International Court of Justice.
52. "But should the public law of one of the Parties seem contrary to inter-
national public policy ('Ordre Public International'), an International Tribunal is
not bound by the municipal law of the States which are Parties to the arbitration."
Norwegian Shipowners' Claim (Norway v. U.S.A). 1 R. INT'L ARS. AwARDs 307, 330
(1922). See also Lipstein, Conflict of Laws Before International Tribunals, 27
GROTIUS SOCY 142, 156-57 (1942).
53. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of
the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDozo L. REV. 481, (1981).
54. Id.
55. Sanders, supra note 44, at 270.
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agreements], the narrower criterion of violation of the international
public order is applied.''56
Varying linguistic interpretations present another question of
interpretation concerning the public policy defense. The French
text of the Convention, which is considered equally authentic, uses
the term "ordre public," which may have a different meaning.57
Some indication as to the proper interpretation of the term "public
policy" can be seen from the effort of the Convention's framers
in trying to narrow the use of the public policy exception from the
exception's use in previous multilateral arbitration agreements. 58
In treaties at recent Hague Conferences, the drafters had made
special note when their intention was to use the broader interpreta-
tion of ordre public.59 The simple use of ordre public in the French
text of the New York Convention, suggests that a narrow construc-
tion should be given "public policy" because no special notation
was made.
Although it appears "the Conference wanted to limit the scope
of the public policy exception as far as possible," 60 the American
delegate pragmatically pointed out, "Certainly 'public policy' will
provide considerable scope for the ingenuity of defense counsel and
it is quite likely that a variety of interpretations will be forthcoming
from courts of different nations.''61
C. Common Law Development of the New York Convention
An examination of the past treatment of the public policy ex-
ception by American courts in international agreements controlled
by the Convention illustrates the acceptable uses of the exception
as well as establishing controlling precedent. In 1979, of 100 cases
applying the Convention, enforcement has been refused for reasons
of public policy only three times.62 In 1984, Giorgio Gaja, editor
of International Commerical Arbitration: New York Convention,
listed 190 reported cases applying the New York Convention around
the world, 43 of which were tried in the United States. Of those
43, only 6 dealt directly with the public policy defense in Article
56. Id. at 270.
57. See Nadelmann and Von Mehren, Equivalences in Treaties in the Con-
flicts Field, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 200 (1967).
58. See generally Haight, supra note 43.
59. Barry, supra note 50, at 840.
60. 2 P. Sanders, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 323 (1959).
61. Haight, supra note 43, at 71.
62. Sanders, supra note 44, at 271.
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V(2)(b) of the New York Convention.63
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court took a step towards
embracing international arbitration as a means of dispute resolu-
tion. The decision that prompted recent developments did not in-
volve an arbitration agreement, but rather, its first cousin, the
choice of forum clause.6 4 In Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co. the
litigants had agreed to submit any disputes arising out of a towage
contract to litigation in London.65 Despite this agreement, when
damage occurred during towing, Zapata refused to submit to the
English court's jurisdiction claiming forum non conveniens.6 6
While the claim was not made that the forum was against public
policy, the Court examined the lower court's remarks concerning
public policy.6 7
The court of appeals had suggested that enforcement would be
contrary to public policy as it was in the case of Bisso v. Inland
Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).68 Bisso concerned a purely
domestic towage contract containing an exculpatory clause that
attempted to disclaim any liability resulting from the tugboat's own
negligence. 6 9 In Bremen the Supreme Court rejected the idea that
domestic public policy mandates that the choice of forum clause
in an international agreement is unenforceable. 70 The Court
distinguished Bremen and Bisso on the grounds that Bremen con-
cerned an "international agreement."-7 1 The Court went on to
describe the essential purpose of international arbitration clauses,
stating "The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in
advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable
element in international trade.- 7 2 Although the public policy de-
fense was not raised, and thus an interpretation of public policy
63. IX Y.B. Comm. Arb. 389, International Council for Commercial Arbitra-
tion (1984).
64. Smedresman, Conflict of Laws in International Commercial Arbitra-
tion: A Survey of Recent Developments, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 263, 329 (1977).
65. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id. at 15.
68. Id. at 15.
69. The court held in Btsso that an exculpatory clause in the towing con-
tract which attempted to place the liability of the towing company's own negligence
on the other party was unenforceable because of public policy. Bisso at 90.
70. 407 U.S. at 15. The Court allowed the litigation to continue in London
realizing that the English court would probably allow the exculpatory clauses in
the contract which relieved Bremen from liability from its own negligence.
71. 407 U.S. at 16.
72. Id. at 13.
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was not needed, the Supreme Court evidenced its attitude that
"We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and in-
ternational waters exclusively on our terms... ,73
The first American court called on to directly interpret the ex-
tent of the public policy defense was the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas
Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier [RAKTA]. 74 The
court saw no definite guidelines from the legislative history of the
Convention nor any convincing arguments from commentators.
The court drew inferences from the Convention as a whole, and
relying on the "general pro-enforcement bias" of the Convention,
recognized only a "narrow reading of the public policy defense. '7 5
The court emphasized that the defense was not to be used to pro-
tect "parochial" national interests but rather that by acceding to
the Convention, the United States was subscribing to a supra-
national interest. This, coupled with fears of retalitory use of the
public policy exception by foreign courts led the Second Circuit
to conclude that enforcement of arbitral awards can be denied only
when enforcement would "violate the forum state's most basic no-
tions of morality and justice. '7 6 Although the court articulated
arguments espousing limited use of the public policy defense, the
standard of "morality and justice" offers little exact guidance.
The Supreme Court continued to distinguish between domestic
public policy and the narrower concept of international public
policy in Scherk v. Albert Culver Co. 7 7 The question in Scherk was
whether to allow the arbitration of a securities issue in an inter-
national contract despite federal statutes prohibiting the waiver
of a right to trial in a securities case.7 8 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court allowed the arbitration in reversing the court of appeals and
its reliance on Wilko v. Swan.7 9 The Wilko decision denied enforce-
ment of arbitration on grounds that the issue concerned the domes-
73. Id. at 9.
74. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); accord Antco Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Sider-
mar S.P.A., 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
75. 508 F.2d at 973.
76. Id. at 974.
77. 417 U.S. 506 (1974), reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
78. Section 14"of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n and Section
29 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78cc(a) both state that any
stipulation requiring a person to waive provisions of the relevant sections shall
be void. The relevant sections are 15 U.S.C. § 77v of the 1933 Act and 15 U.S.C.
78aa of the 1934 Act which allow the plaintiff to bring suit in the proper court.
79. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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tic sale of securities and that public policy was against arbitration
on questions of securities transactions as evidence by the Securities
Act of 1933.80 The Court in Scherk distinguished Wilko by noting
that Scherk, although still a securities matter, dealt with a con-
tract that was a "truly international agreement."81 Thus, the Court
felt more aligned with the policy articulated in Bremen. The Court
followed much the same reasoning found in Bremen by comment-
ing on the importance of arbitration clauses to achieve certainty
in international transactions, as well as the need to avoid parochial
refusals of enforcement which may incite the parties to destruc-
tive tactical jockeying.82 This tactical jockeying may occur if parties
begin to forum shop on the international level to find a country
that will issue an order to enjoin litigation wherever it may have
started to allow the arbitration to continue. These tactics are de-
structive in that they undermine the certainty of international
litigation and thus trade agreements. The "internationalism" of
the agreement seemed to be determinative. 83 The Court also looked
closely at the goal of the New York Convention and felt United
States ratification of the Convention was strongly persuasive evi-
dence of congressional policy consistent with its decision.8 4
Yet, there still emerged no clear guidelines from Scherk except
possibly the necessity that the contract be truly "international"
for the public policy exception to prevail. 85
One year later in Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co. Ltd.,86 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit again followed the
reasoning of Bremen and enforced an arbitration clause in an in-
ternational contract when the court probably would not have en-
forced the agreement had the arbitration clause been in a purely
domestic context. In Fotochrome the court reversed the bankruptcy
court's stay of arbitration proceedings. The court noted that there
was no reference to the type of public policy required for non-
recognition of foreign arbitral awards. The court also pointed out
that the legislative history offered no concrete guidelines.87 The
80. Id. at 431.
81. Scherk, 417 U.S. 506, 515 (1974).
82. Id. at 516, 517.
83. Id. at 519.
84. Id. at 520, n.15.
85. Although the court concedes that "situations may arise where the con-
tacts with foreign countries are so insignificant or attenuated that the holding in
Wilko would meaningfully apply." Id. at 517, n. 11.
86. 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
87. Id. at 516.
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court stressed the strong policy in favor of international recogni-
tion and adopted the Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co.8 guide-
line of "most basic notions of morality and justice." 89
In 1983 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
grappled with the guidelines and precedent of Scherk, Bremen,
and the New York Convention itself only to refuse recognition and
enforcement of an arbitration clause in Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.90 Although in Mitsubishi the court
actually ruled that antitrust issues are not a subject matter capable
of settlement by arbitration under Article V, the court also dis-
cussed the public policy issues of Article V(2)(b) in the New York
Convention. 91
The court distinguished Scherk and indentified the principle that
courts cannot refuse to enforce arbitration because of "parochial"
reasons. However, the court argued that the strong American policy
against arbitrating antitrust issues92 is well known, and therefore,
not a parochial reason. 93 The court attacked the premise that in-
ternational agreements may be protected from United States laws
by arbitration agreements. The court felt it would be too easy for
American businesses to achieve immunity from antitrust laws by
the device of a sham agreement with a foreign entity.94
While the resulting impact of Mitsubishi on the vagaries of
judicial guidelines as to the V(2)(b) public policy exception may
be unclear and indirect, it does appear that two conflicting points
have been made be the First Circuit. First, the international flavor
of a contract may not ensure enforcement of an arbitration clause.
Second, that allegedly "parochial" policies may not be enough to
override arbitration.
In the end, the court uses a balancing test derived from Scherk
in which the court must "weigh the private party's interest in the
arbitration of international contract disputes against the public's
interest in the preservation of economic order in the United
States."9 5 The court is not to accept the private interest in arbitra-
tion at the expense of public policy if to do so is unreasonable. 96
88. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie
Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
89. Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co. Ltd., 517 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1975).
90. 723 F.2d 155 (1983).
91. Id. at 164 & 166.
92. "Anti-trust laws being the Magna Carta of free Enterprise" Id. at 163.
93. Id. at 167.
94. Id. at 163.
95. Id. at 168.
96. Id. at 168.
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Thus, the final guideline for the First Circuit becomes the internal,
infernal, standard of "reasonableness."
The aforementioned cases illustrate that the courts' articulated
standards permit the public policy defense when enforcement of
the arbitration award would "violate basic notions of morality and
justice." 97 However, allegedly parochial reasons98 cannot deny en-
forcement of an arbitration clause in a truly international
agreement. 99 Obviously, the standards articulated by the courts
are vague and subjective. References to these standards do little
to clarify a particular case. However, the reasons the courts have
construed the defense so narrowly are: a fear of retaliatory
nonenforcement, 100 acceptance of the need for arbitration in in-
ternational trade,' 10 a recognition that the United States has no
right to claim international supremacy, 0 2 and a view that the Con-
vention indicates acceptance of narrow interpretation of the public
policy defense. 10 3
It appears from Scherk and Mitsubishi that the courts apply a
basic balancing test of public versus private interests. The path
to close the public policy loophole has been illuminated by the
previously discussed commentators and court decisions which
argue there is a general pro-enforcement attitude evidenced by the
United States accession to the New York Convention. Completion
of the path may best be achieved by arguing the positive effect of
arbitration clauses on international trade in general. Certainly
under the current problematic guidelines of the public policy
defense there is an opportunity for the defense to be rejected in
any specific case. Indeed, as one commentator, John Junker,
argues, "the courts have given the public policy defense so narrow
a construction that it now must be characterized as a defense
without meaningful definition." 104 Junker concludes that since the
courts have emasculated the public policy defense, "then the use
of international commercial arbitration may mean a significant
sacrifice of American governmental or statutory protections.'u10
97. See note 58 and 70 supra.
98. See note 57 supra.
99. See note 64 supra.
100. See note 74 supra.
101. See note 54 supra.
102. See note 55 supra.
103. See note 57 supra.
104. Note, supra note 42, at 245.
105. Id. at 246.
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Mitsubishi, however, negates the argument that the defense is
meaningless. The court in Mitsubishi spoke favorably of the public
policy defense, yet the court articulated this same fear of losing
the sanctions and protection of United States laws. 10 6
Junker concludes that the loss of the protections of American
law will result in a crippling deterrent to agreements to employ
arbitration as opposed to the contribution which the courts and
the framers intended.10 7 Although Junker's note may appear well
reasoned, it seems to emphasize the "protection" of United States
statutes, while Mitsubishi seems to be pointing out that one can-
not blindly hope to escape the "protection" of United States laws
with an arbitration clause. Junker also seems to ignore the role
of an arbitrator in avoiding fundamental unfairness between the
parties. 108 This protection against unfairness is much the same goal
as the protection of the United States statutes.
Junker also overlooks the ability of the parties to foresee and
allocate the risks of the agreement under the freedom to contract.
Indeed, the rationale for enforcing arbitration clauses rests largely
on what the Supreme Court has called "ancient concepts of free-
dom of contract" in allowing international businesses to agree
beforehand to a neutral forum in case of dispute. 0 9 Freedom to
contract, however, does have its limits. 110 Professor Sterk argues
that despite the apparent opacity of the term "public policy," its
use by the courts can be explained by a common rationale."'
He states:
Public policy should be invoked to prevent arbitration when at issue
is a legislative expression or basic case law principle designed for some
purpose other than to foster justice between the parties in dispute. Con-
versely, when the legal principles involved in a particular dispute are
designed primarily to promote justice between the parties, there is little
reason to prohibit arbitration.11 2
106. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d 155, 163 (1st Cir. 1983).
107. Note, supra note 42, at 247.
108. DoMKE COMM. ARBITRATION § 25:01 (Rev. Ed).
109. Bremen, 407 U.S. 1. 11 (1975).
110. Contracts otherwise thought to be a valid offer and acceptance with ade-
quate consideration may be voided by the defense of: incapacity, mistake, mis-
representation, duress, undue influence, unconscionability, and public policy. A
contract cannot override these limitations on the contract. An arbitrator may also
take the presence of these factors into consideration.
111. Sterk, supra note 53, at 483.
112. Id. at 483.
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III. SUGGESTED STANDARDS FOR THE ACCEPTANCE
OF THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE
This author would like to suggest the injection of Professor
Sterk's criteria into the previously articulated standards of the
proper use of the public policy exception in order to clarify the
proper extent of the exception. It seems clear enough that there
is no purpose in overriding an arbitration agreement (by not en-
forcing it) when the arbitrator is attempting to resolve a dispute
if the impact of that dispute is entirely between the parties to the
arbitration. The concern that a party is waiving the protection of
United States statutes is diminished by the arbitrator's judgement
of fairness, and one's freedom to allocate risks with the contract.
However, in some areas legal rules are designed to promote in-
terests that are beyond the fair resolution of the issue between the
two parties. In these areas of dispute, such as antitrust, public
policy should be used to override the arbitration agreement because
the arbitration will not necessarily consider or protect the interests
of the public at large or the interests that third parties may have
in the dispute. 113 The court in Mitsubishi recognizes this reason-
ing by distinguishing Scherk as an allowable arbitration because
the securities laws are designed to protect a fairly small special
interest group while antitrust laws, the issue in Mitsubishi, pro-
tect the general public.' 14
The New York Convention of 1958 has been hailed as an impor-
tant step forward," 5 a considerable success, 116 or even the begin-
ning of a new "Esperanto" of international arbitration law. 117 The
public policy clause, however, is a loophole of concern for those
who wish to expand, narrow, or simply define the clause. A clear
definition would promote the goal of alternative dispute resolution
by increasing the simplicity and certainty of arbitration in the con-
text of international trade. While the courts have been reluctant
to issue definite guidelines on the use of the public policy defense,
they should be encouraged to articulate a clear standard of an ac-
ceptable public policy defense based on the reasoning that they
have developed. The freedom to contract between two parties can
be upheld, and the essence of the Convention supported, by a
113. Id. at 492.
114. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d 155, 168 (1st Cir. 1983).
115. Sanders, supra note 60, at 323.
116. Sanders, supra note 44, at 269.
117. Aksen, supra note 14, at 26.
382 [Vol. 1:2
1986] ARBITRAL AWARDS 383
balancing of all the factors in denying the public policy defense
and enforcing arbitration awards in cases concerning international
contracts containing arbitration clauses fairly bargained for which
substantially affect only the interests of the contracting parties.
The public policy defense should prevail to deny enforcement
of an arbitral award only when that award violates the forum's most
basic notions of morality and justice, and also disregards any
significantly detrimental impact on the public's interests.

